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Smoke and Mirrors: the influence of cultural inertia on 
social and economic development in a polycentric urban 
region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This article presents a case study of Tees Valley, a polycentric urban 
region in North East England, which has faced significant social and 
economic challenges over the last 30 years. The purpose of this article is 
to explore the potential of employing the idea of 'cultural inertia' to help 
explain why the area has been slow fully to recover from a period of 
industrial restructuring. Cultural inertia is defined as a shared mind-set 
(held by key stakeholders in the public, private and third sectors, by local 
politicians and by the population in general) which can help or hinder an 
area in its future development. Cultural inertia, it is argued, produces and 
reproduces tolerances and intolerances to change and informs people in 
the locality about what is possible and desirable. While cultural inertia is 
defined as a commonly accepted mind set about local potentiality, this 
does not mean that such ideas are necessarily grounded in empirical 
reality. Indeed, is it argued that many of the oft-quoted and taken-for-
granted assumptions about what constrains progress in achieving 
recovery (in comparison with other areas) may actually be false.  
 It is not argued that once 'negative' cultural inertia has become 
embedded this cannot be reversed. On the contrary, there are many 
examples of successful former industrial core cities in northern England 
and elsewhere in Europe and North America whose champions have built 
more a confident sense of local culture and place, and reversed an 
apparently unstoppable cycle of decline. Instead, it concentrates on the 
particular problems faced by polycentric urban regions which have 
complex systems of governance and lack a clearly identifiable civic core 
which can act as a focus for transformation.  
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The area under scrutiny has a long distance yet to travel before it 
can claim to have established itself as a successful city region, but there 
have been signs of positive change. In early 2007 a City Region Business 
Case was published, based on many months of intensive strategic 
planning by key stakeholders across Tees Valley (Tees Valley Joint 
Strategy Unit, 2007).1 The purpose of the plan was to establish a new 
executive body, Tees Valley Unlimited, to lead economic development by 
integrating the efforts of the five unitary authorities which comprise the 
sub-region. It is not, though, the intention of this article directly to evaluate 
the prospects for success with this strategy - but to explore the efficacy of 
cultural inertia as an explanatory variable when studying those factors 
which promote or constrain positive change. 
The article is divided into four sections. Section one develops the 
conceptual ideas upon which subsequent analysis is based beginning with 
a critical discussion of the concept of the polycentric urban region (PUR) 
and its application to Tees Valley. Following this, cultural inertia is defined. 
Section two details the research methods in this study. Section three 
outlines the key problems and challenges facing Tees Valley as defined by 
key stakeholders, and then explores four ways that slow development is 
accounted for. In so doing, the analysis demonstrates how cultural inertia 
limits potential for radical change. The concluding section summarises the 
commonly accepted explanations for social and economic retardation. I 
then challenge their accuracy and efficacy on the basis of the analytical 
work undertaken in the article. 
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POLYCENTRICITY AND CULTURAL INERTIA 
What are polycentric urban regions? 
There is much academic and policy debate in the UK at national, regional 
and local levels on the role of cities as economic drivers (see, for example, 
Core Cities Group, 2004; HM Treasury, 2006; Fothergill, 2005). Many of 
Britain's larger cities have experienced something of a rebirth over the last 
two decades. But what factors led to this success? HM Treasury’s State of 
the Cities Report (Parkinson, et al. 2006) identifies a number of key factors 
which have helped provincial cities in the UK become more socially and 
economically dynamic. Firstly, such cities have reversed population 
decline through significant inward migration. This has been led by a 
renewed interest in city living especially amongst younger people and has 
resulted in a boom in city centre housing and apartment development (see 
also, Champion, 2001). Secondly, the quality of the employment offer in 
successful cities has improved with evidence of significant wage 
increases. Thirdly, cities have been the drivers of employment growth, 
often through discrete industrial sectoral development. Fourthly, quality of 
life (or liveability) in cities has been transformed by improving cultural, 
leisure and retailing opportunities and improving perceptions of community 
safety. While positive change has been identified, many northern English 
cities continue to suffer from significant problems of concentrated urban 
deprivation (Jones 2006b).  
 In northern England, the success of key cities, especially 
Manchester, Leeds and to a lesser extent, Sheffield, Liverpool and 
Newcastle upon Tyne has generated much political excitement. But there 
is an awareness that smaller cities and urban conurbations have not 
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developed at the same pace, especially so when they sit in the shadow of 
more successful urban areas.2 This awareness has fuelled government 
interest in the promotion of integrated 'city region' strategies in less 
successful peripheral areas so that they may benefit from the emulation of, 
and closer interaction with more successful core areas. In the 
government’s Review of Sub-National Economic Development and 
Regeneration (2007, see also, Fothergill, 2005), it was stated that:  
We also need to support sub-regions, including city-regions, to 
promote economic growth. We will work with sub-regions to allow 
economic development issues to be managed at this level. This will 
include exploring the potential for groups of local authorities to 
establish statutory sub-regional bodies for economic development 
policy areas beyond transport. (2007: 3)3 
Implicit in much of the political argument for the city region is an 
assumption that if the component parts of a city region share a 
complimentary range of key characteristics, then the ‘value’ of the whole 
region will be greater than that of its constituent parts (Parkinson et al. 
2006). The currency of debate on the benefits of defining urban 
conurbations as city regions is supported to some extent by a related 
stream of academic analysis of PURs (see Batty, 2001; Bontje, 2001; 
Kloosterman and Lambregts, 2001; Kloosterman and Musterd, 2001). 
Academic interest in PURs emerged in response to a critical evaluation of 
the salience of studying cities as monocentric entities. Crudely put, the 
monocentric model assumes that city centres control the economic, social 
and spatial relationships in the urban periphery. Adopting monocentric 
models have clear drawbacks as spatial interactions within cities have 
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become more complex; if, indeed, such models ever adequately described 
the structures, cultures and functions of modern cities.  
The political attraction of defining proximate urban areas as PURs 
is explicable. As Bailey and Turok (2001) note, this appeal arises from the 
notion that if proximate towns and cities join forces they can become more 
competitive by taking advantage of (1) economies of scale, (2) industrial 
sectoral cooperation and integration, (3) sharing the benefits of a larger 
labour market, (4) pooling education, research and knowledge based 
services, (5) sharing business networks, (6) reduced transaction costs, (7) 
shared facilities such as seaports and airports, (7) knowledge sharing, and 
(8) exploiting complimentarity (that is, to focus on local strengths). While 
potential benefits can be identified, Bailey and Turok express some 
caution about over exaggerating such benefits.  
 
'The process of interaction between centres leading to the 
reallocation of activities between them is portrayed as beneficial for 
the region and hence an argument in favour of PURs. In practice, 
the outcome is likely to be uneven with winners and losers. Some 
centres will lose particular types of employment and some may 
experience an overall decline in employment, with potentially 
severe impacts on particular social groups. Such impacts generate 
political tensions which undermine regional coherence and 
consensus so they cannot be ignored.' (2001:701)  
 
It is tempting to shoe-horn areas together because they are 
spatially proximate, but as Musterd and van Zelm argue, it is necessary to 
identify an 'intensive set of social and economic interactions' not just an 
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'image on the map' (2001: 680). As Bailey and Turok (2001) show in their 
study of interactions between Edinburgh and Glasgow in the Central 
Lowlands of Scotland, for example, there appears on the surface to be 
some scope to define the area as a PUR, In reality, however, the cultural, 
economic, social and political differences between the two cities are so 
pronounced that the project soon falls apart. 
Much of the academic debate on interactions in PURs has tended 
to focus on core cities or larger-scale city regions rather than or smaller 
cities. Such a focus is explicable. It would be odd, after all, for UK 
academics to devote more attention to the development of, say, Plymouth, 
Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland or Dundee than to its major metropolitan 
areas. As Parr notes, the presumed advantages of PURs need to be 
qualified when applied to smaller urban areas:  
 
‘…its distinctive spatial structure may in certain instances represent 
an overall liability. Problems such as dispersed urban population, 
small-scale infrastructure facilities, the lack of high-order business 
services and the division of effort among competing centres may all 
combine to form an unfavourable investment environment' (2004: 
236). 
 
 This case study follows Bailey and Turok's, and Parr's critical 
understanding of the concept of the PUR to help explore the potential for 
the development of a 'city region' in Tees Valley. Their approach is 
extended, however, by introducing to the analysis the concept of 'cultural 
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inertia' to show what factors may enhance or constrain development in 
such areas.  
 
Cultural inertia in polycentric urban regions 
Cultural inertia is defined here as the process by which individuals and 
organisations absorb, adopt, adapt and reinforce taken-for-granted 
assumptions about an area’s potentiality. The term cultural inertia is rarely 
used in the context of spatial studies (see Castanega, 2006; van Houston 
and Lagendijk, 2001) and even in the field of organisational studies, where 
the term is employed more frequently, the idea remains relatively under-
developed (for a recent analysis, see Carrillo and Gromb, 2007). While I 
do not want to over-theorise the idea, it is useful to acknowledge the value 
of three interrelated theoretical strands which inform the term. Firstly, path 
dependency theory and the associated concept of lock-ins; secondly, 
structuration theory which helps to explain how patterned interactions are 
reproduced in social systems; and thirdly, symbolic interactionist notions of 
identity to show how 'places' position themselves in relation to proximate 
or other significant areas.  
Cultural inertia may usefully be conceptualised along side path 
dependency theory and incorporate aspects of the complimentary concept 
of lock-ins. Path dependency theory is appealing to many economic 
geographers, historians and sociologists interested in development and in 
spatial-historical analyses. Mahoney (2000) shows that this approach 
encourages analysts to plot sequences of key historical events, identify 
‘critical junctures’ where strings of events collide, and in so doing explain 
what factors contribute to change (whether they were intended or 
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‘contingent’). Path dependency theory has several variants, including 
utilitarian, functionalist, power (or conflict theory) and social legitimation 
explanations. All four variants, as Mahoney demonstrates can help to 
account for the way that social institutions reproduce themselves over 
time, even if the initial purpose for them being there has changed or been 
eradicated. In this sense path dependency theory helps to describe 
processes and patterns of change. 
The related idea of 'lock-ins' helps to inform the development of an 
understanding of cultural inertia in a more immediate way. Grabher (1993) 
recognised that the future success of regions (which had developed strong 
industrial clusters and integrated infrastructures to support them in the 
past, but had experienced significant industrial restructuring) could be 
inhibited by vested interests. '…their industrial atmosphere, highly 
developed and specialized infrastructure, the close interfirm linkages, and 
strong political support by regional institutions - turned into stubborn 
obstacles to innovation.' (1993: 256). Grabher identified three inter-related 
elements of lock-in: functional lock-in (co-dependent relationships between 
businesses); cognitive lock-in (accepted discourses surrounding economic 
cycles); and, political lock-in (the maintenance of allegiance and 
commitment to existing industrial clusters). The argument, essentially, is 
that these factors collectively limit the scope for economic and political 
investment in new areas of development and innovation because key 
stakeholders are unable to 'unlearn' old tricks (Maskell and Malmberg, 
1999). This in turn, can lead to political conservatism, as Hassink and Shin 
(2005), in reviewing the literature on lock-ins, observe: 
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…large companies do not want to give up sites for the attraction of 
inward investment, as they are afraid to lose qualified employees to 
competitors. Local authorities do not see the point in attracting 
inward investment or in promoting restructuring in another way, as 
large tax incomes are paid by traditional industries. In some 
regional production clusters, the spirit of the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur might dwindle because of an increasing industrial 
concentration and the domination of large companies. (2005: 573) 
 
Hassink and Shin argue that while there is a strong focus on path 
dependency and lock-ins in the learning-region literature 'little has been 
said about how lock-ins emerge, what factors affect their strength and 
what exactly distinguishes lock-ins favourable to regional economies from 
unfavourable ones' (2005: 574). I cannot claim to answer these questions 
fully through 'cultural inertia', but the concept may help demonstrate how 
myths and rituals about local economy, identity, society and place are 
socially reproduced. 
 The appeal of Giddens' conceptualisation of structuration lies in his 
emphasis on the interdependent relationship between structural factors 
and individual agency. Giddens argues that structure forms and shapes 
personality, but avoids the pitfalls of structural functionalist thinking by 
recognising that individual agency is always a force for social change - 
even if the actions of individuals often have unintended consequences. In 
short, structure does not act as an impediment of social action, but does 
play an integral role in the production of social action. Structuration is a 
dynamic concept, therefore, which accounts for social change as structural 
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circumstances alter or as actors' attitudes, beliefs and behaviours 
precipitate social change.  Structuration explains how the interaction 
between agency and structure occurs in complex and sometimes 
contradictory ways. Giddens briefly draws upon interactionist theory to 
help to explain why actors come to accept that their social system has a 
particular set of attributes which may, or may not, have a foundation in 
empirical reality. Drawing upon primary and more recent interactionist 
analysis, it is possible to explain how such cultural continuities are 
reproduced.  
As is suggested in this article's title, by 'smoke and mirrors' I allude 
to two interrelated issues. First, that complete clarity of vision and 
understanding about the characteristics and potentiality of a particular 
area is impossible to achieve because interpretations are obfuscated by 
deeply embedded cultural conditions. Myths which are internalised locally 
and the rituals which reinforce them, for example, help to make sense of a 
place, but are not necessarily grounded in empirical reality. The second, is 
that actors make sense of place by making more or less positive 
comparisons with other areas. It is useful to draw a parallel between the 
way that 'individuals' and 'places' may position themselves in identity terms 
in the wider social world. Interactionist sociology, which draws upon 
Charles Cooley's development of the Jamesian notion of the 'looking glass 
self' (Coser 1977: 355) informs us that people achieve a sense of selfhood 
by positioning themselves in relation to significant others. Studying places 
is more complex because they are composites of thousands of individual 
actors with diverse backgrounds, values, capabilities and interests. That 
said, people in places do seem to construct a sense of local self identity 
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(Parker, 2000; Massey, 1995; van der Graaf, 2009). The fact that some 
places assume social superiority over others derives from the process of 
comparison. A sense of social superiority, once established, tends to 
reproduce itself; providing that enough evidence, prejudicial or otherwise, 
can be garnered (or ignored) to demonstrate that the assumption is true.  
A sense of comparable inferiority also requires explanation. Few 
places would wish to account for a perceived failure to thrive as their own 
fault and as a consequence draw on other explanations to account for 
their situation. An alternative approach is to blame something or 
somebody else, as anthropologist Katherine Newman (1988) has shown in 
her study of downward social mobility. Newman uses the concept of 
‘categorical fate’ to show how redundant senior executives accounted for 
their plight by externalising responsibility.  Many claimed that their ‘best 
attributes’ had not been appreciated and believed that they had been fired 
because their value system was ‘too ethical’ or their ideas ‘too good’ for 
the corporation to recognise. By stating that a mistake had been made by 
someone else, the awkward problem of realising their own potential by 
harnessing their other positive attributes became conveniently hidden from 
view. 
It is possible that places, like people, also construct arguments to 
account for failure by incorporating elements of categorical fate. This is not 
to argue, of course, that externally driven problems are not hugely 
important, such as the closure of a major industry, as has recently been 
the case in Tees Valley. Such events do have a massive impact on the 
local economy – it is not just an attitude of mind. But in terms of planning 
for recovery, arguments that rely on aspects of categorical fate could 
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result in key stakeholders (and people in general) relying on arguments 
that limit the scope for positive action. As indicated in Grabher’s concept of 
lock-in, stakeholders may continue to promulgate ideas about the kinds of 
economic activity that the area should be involved in, to the detriment of 
other potentialities that could be realised.  
Analysing cultural inertia, in summary, involves the process of 
making sense of the stories that places tell about themselves and the 
assessment of how these accounts impact on the way that opportunities 
are identified, are rejected, are ignored or go unseen.  By defining cultural 
inertia in this way, it is not assumed necessarily to be a negative 
phenomenon. Indeed, it can be argued that the economic, cultural and 
social vibrancy of the most successful cities is sustained precisely 
because people who live there (or migrate to that area) expect the best 
outcomes for themselves; and as a consequence, they adopt practices to 
ensure that they perpetuate it. Neither is it assumed that any area could 
be entirely positive or entirely negative about its potentiality. Local 
circumstances are never that clear cut, as Hassink and Shin argue, 'The 
line… between successful and open regions and old industrialised, insular, 
inward-looking areas can be very thin' (2005: 573).  Instead, the term is 
adopted to capture a sense of the social, political and cultural 'mood' and 
to assess its impact on how places plan for the future.  
  
Polycentricity in Tees Valley 
When an area suffers economic decline, the area has to tell itself a story 
about why that situation came about and to accommodate in cultural terms 
to its prospects for the future. This process may be more complex in PURs 
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because they lack a distinct urban core. It is useful now to define different 
ways PURs may develop in order to categorise the Tees Valley more 
clearly. Champion (2001) identifies three ways in which urban areas can 
become PURs. First, he describes the 'centrifugal mode', where urban 
rents or other inner-city problems such as accessibility from outlying areas 
force businesses onto the periphery. Second, the incorporation mode, 
where other formerly quasi-autonomous urban centres in the vicinity of 
core cities are drawn into a seamless conurbation. Outlying areas can 
ultimately challenge the supremacy of the city centre, as is the case of the 
development of the so-called 'edge cities' (Garreau, 1991). Finally, 
Champion defines the fusion mode, where separate and distinct centres of 
similar size are drawn together through, for example, improved transport 
and suburban growth into de facto conurbations. The Tees Valley city 
region (like North Staffordshire, see Parker 2000) most closely resembles 
the third mode, although the extent to which fusion has yet occurred 
remains contentious and will be explored further in this article.  
 
Map one about here 
 
 As shown on Map 1, Tees Valley is formed from five unitary local 
authorities: Darlington, Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, Redcar and Cleveland 
and Stockton-on-Tees. Each borough has a principal town, but there are 
also several sizeable but smaller towns and townships which have 
distinctive identities (including, amongst others: Billingham, Guisborough, 
Saltburn, South Bank, Thornaby and Yarm).  
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Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 provides data on the key spatial, demographic, social and 
economic characteristics of Tees Valley which indicates the extent of 
polycentricity. It is clear that none of the boroughs are dominant in 
population or spatial terms. Similarly, the size of the labour markets across 
the boroughs are broadly similar and show extensive commuting, 
suggesting significant economic interdependence (see Townsend 2005). 
These data also provide clues about the economic and social vibrancy of 
the area. Entrepreneurship is very low by national standards, with VAT 
registrations standing at almost half of the national average. Social 
deprivation is a pernicious problem, as shown by the high proportion of 
low income households, incapacity benefit claimants and the number of 
people suffering limiting long-term illnesses. In fact these data mask the 
depth of localised deprivation: a total of 42 per cent of wards in Tees 
Valley are amongst the 10 per cent most deprived wards in the country. In 
sum, these data indicate that Tees Valley as a whole faces a challenging 
future. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This article draws upon evidence gained from a study of social and 
economic change in Tees Valley.4 The research proceeded with a wide-
ranging brief to examine the interaction between industrial sectoral, labour 
market, and social, political and economic change across the five 
boroughs. The project drew upon evidence from three sources: an 
exploration of statistical data on demographic and labour market change: 
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an intensive literature search on national, regional and sub-regional 
research and policy documentation; and thirdly, qualitative research with 
key stakeholders. This article reports on previously unpublished data 
drawn from two hour in-depth interviews undertaken with 28 key 
stakeholders in the summer of 2006. Respondents included senior officers 
in local authorities and government agencies with a brief to tackle social 
and economic development, together with senior representatives from the 
private and third sector.  
 Following the analysis of interview data, three focus groups were 
arranged to debate findings in September/October 2006. In total, 42 
stakeholders joined one or more of these three-hour policy seminars. The 
seminars' purpose was to develop a working model on the opportunities 
and constraints for sub-regional social and economic development over 
the next twenty years in Tees Valley. While this article reports primarily 
upon the qualitative work undertaken in this project, it should be 
recognised that its findings are underpinned by the statistical and literature 
analyses which are reported elsewhere (Chapman et al., 2007).  
 
CHALLENGES FACED BY TEES VALLEY 
My interest in the idea of cultural inertia emerged when it became clear 
from in-depth interviews and focus groups that key decision makers in the 
area were often aware of positive actions that needed to be taken to serve 
the interests of the area as a whole, but that something held them back 
from pushing such ideas forward. Often, the area settled for less 
imaginative compromises which could result in the reintroduction of 
previous or repackaging of existing initiatives, or favoured inaction 
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because of an expectation that local factors would scupper radical action. 
The principal factor which dampened ambition was the polycentric urban 
characteristics of Tees Valley which militates against effective sub-region 
wide cooperation.  
Participants in focus groups also agreed that change was difficult to 
achieve, but this did not deter them from debating what needed, in an 
‘ideal world’, to be done.5 In three successive focus groups, it became 
apparent that participants shared a similar understanding of the 
challenges that Tees Valley faces. Debate led to the identification of three 
key factors which needed simultaneously to be addressed to improve 
economic prospects. First, the development of positive aspirations across 
all interest groups to ensure that the sub-region does not accept second 
best solutions. Second, the improvement of liveability to attract and retain 
economically active people and to create a positive environment for social 
and economic investment. And third, the improvement of the employment 
offer so that people have a reasonable prospect of achieving aspirations 
and to invest in the area.  
Identifying what needed to be done in an ideal world is one thing, 
but asking stakeholders to identify mechanisms to achieve positive change 
is another. Indeed, evidence from in-depth interviews had produced 'so 
many' issues which had to be tackled that effecting change appeared to be 
an insurmountable problem. Consequently, policy interventions operated 
on the principle of ‘keeping the ship afloat’ rather than attempting radical 
change. One respondent described this as a 'sticking plaster mind set', 
where public, private and third sector organisations unwittingly contributed 
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to the reproduction of a cycle of underachievement relative to other areas, 
so depressing aspirations for the future.  
In focus groups, stakeholders agreed four principal explanations for 
Tees Valley’s limited progress as shown in Figure 1. In the inner circle, 
factors that reproduce retarded development relative to other areas are 
positioned as if locked in a 'vicious circle'. On the outer circle of the 
diagram, explanations for underperformance are highlighted: politics and 
governance, externalities, liveability and migration. This diagram 
encapsulates the 'story' that the area tells itself to explain its situation. In 
the remainder of this section of the article, each of these explanations are 
analysed critically to show how cultural inertia is reproduced.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Politics and governance 
Adopting Newman’s (1988) concept of ‘categorical fate’, discussed above, 
it has been argued that areas which suffer economic decline construct 
palatable stories to account for their situation. In a PUR this is a 
particularly complex process because explanations emanate from local, 
regional, national and global circumstances. 
Parochialism and rivalry across the PUR inhibited attempts to tackle 
sub-region wide priorities. Rivalry was rooted in ancient cultural 
associations with place6 and has been compounded by recurrent change 
in governance arrangements. Up to the early 1970s the area was divided 
by the boundary between the North Riding of Yorkshire and County 
Durham. Following county reorganisation, Cleveland County Council was 
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established in 1974, so providing area-wide focus for strategic planning 
(apart from Darlington which remained in County Durham). In 1996, 
Cleveland County Council was abolished, and four unitary local authorities 
were established, so breaking up much of the established political and 
infrastructural capacity for integrated planning in the area. Darlington also 
gained unitary status in 1997 and the term Tees Valley was progressively 
adopted to define the sub-region. Finally, following the establishment of 
the Regional Development Agency, and incentivised by the prospect of 
European Regional Development Funds, Tees Valley became a sub-
regional strategic partnership.  
Some nostalgic association with Cleveland County Council was felt 
by interviewees from the four eastern unitary authorities, particularly in 
terms of county-wide economic development and infrastructure planning. 
However, few thought of them as halcyon days, but rather as a period of 
political complexity as the County Council attempted to broker agreements 
between competing local interests. This process was not helped, arguably, 
by the operation of the largely autonomous government funded Teesside 
Development Corporation between 1988 and 1997 which operated a 
policy of ‘brinkmanship, often involving playing one authority off against 
another’ (Robinson, et al., 1999: 162). 
Having established that competition over resources was endemic 
across Tees Valley, focus groups discussed the prospects for a closer 
confederation between the five unitary authorities in a newly proposed city 
region.7 While the majority claimed personally to favour the idea, in 
principle, most doubted whether there was sufficient political will at local 
level to make it work. Responsibility was deflected to elected Members, 
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whose parochialism was presumed to result in a very strong focus on 
borough level needs (or in the case of some boroughs, different towns 
within the authority).  
Inter-authority competition was regarded as explicable as 
councillors had to work to local agendas in order to preserve political 
support. That said, participants agreed that most elected Members failed 
fully to appreciate the level of inter-dependence between boroughs, 
especially so in terms of labour market integration.  As one respondent 
stated: ‘It’s like five cats in a bag. Basically it’s five separate agendas 
moving forward in more or less the same direction – it’s not ideal.’ This led 
to, for example, focusing on job creation for 'their town' under the 
misapprehension that local residents would be the only, or even the most 
likely, recipients of opportunities. As indicated in Table 1, there is 
significant commuting between the five boroughs of Tees Valley. As 
Townsend (2005) has demonstrated, there is also significant inward and 
outward commuting from Tees Valley into North Yorkshire and the 
Humber, County Durham and Tyne and Wear.8  Townsend (2005) 
demonstrates that professionals and senior managers are the most likely 
to commute between boroughs or beyond the sub-region, but also shows 
that there is very significant commuting amongst lower-skilled 
occupational groups. In spite of extensive commuting, local authorities 
tended to plan at borough level and often failed to recognise the 
incongruity between patterns of labour market activity of the resident 
population compared with the local labour market itself. This may be one 
of the most limiting aspects of policy development in the area – especially 
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so given that serious skill shortages in the east of the region are not being 
met by integrated sub-regional planning.9  
Parochialism was also thought to limit the scope for shared 
economic investment in major projects. It was generally agreed that the 
area attracts few big private sector projects mainly because it does not 
have an identifiable urban core. Instead, the area is generally reliant on 
public sector funded regeneration projects. These are fought for 
competitively and have resulted in, according to focus group participants, 
either a multitude of lower-quality outcomes, or result in shared projects 
with compromised outcomes. In the mirror of bigger and better city-scale 
projects in other areas (such as Leeds and Newcastle), the achievements 
of Tees Valley seemed to be ‘second best’ by comparison. It was agreed 
that polycentricity reinforced parochialism and weakened the sub-region's 
response to collectively owned challenges.  
Reportage of 'other peoples' parochialism by focus group 
participants should not, of course, be taken at face value. Elected 
members do not have a free hand to do what they want as they are 
constrained by a plethora rules on local taxation, planning and spending. 
Similarly, dedicated government funds to tackle particular priorities (such 
as Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders, Local Economic Growth 
Initiatives, Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders, New Deal for 
Communities, and so on) were offered on a competitive basis, effectively 
forcing competition between boroughs.10  
Neither can it be assumed that public sector officers rise above 
parochialism when they have to manage and sustain resource hungry 
organisations. Indeed, as the public sector is the dominant employer in all 
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five boroughs, such boundary maintenance is a very strong imperative. In 
areas with a dominant private sector, the public sector is more likely to 
enter a responsive mode of operation to facilitate of continued economic 
growth through for example infrastructure projects to ease traffic 
congestion or plan for new housing. In areas with a weak private sector, 
the public sector is likely to enter a reactive mode which is led by, for 
example, government regeneration initiatives (see also, Robinson, 2002; 
Le Gales, 2002). In a PUR, such as Tees Valley, reactions to government 
regeneration initiatives are competitive and are inevitably made on the 
basis of local assessments of the severity of need. This can produce a 
political climate wherein areas compete to show how bad things are in 
their area rather than considering its potential.  
During in-depth interviews and in focus groups, local authority 
officers11 routinely commented that their borough was disadvantaged 
relative to others (for example, by being: too small, suffering population 
decline, spatially fractured or isolated, suffering multiple deprivation, and 
so on). Moreover, if one area was comparably better off than their 
neighbours, arguments were constructed to show how difficult the situation 
was there too. This aptly demonstrates how in a PUR, public sector 
officers have to persuade government to award their borough funding at 
the expense of another – so reproducing negative cultural inertia.12  
At regional level, the political environment was also thought to 
weaken Tees Valley. The dominance of the regional capital in political 
decision making was generally accepted as a principal explanation for the 
apparent success of Newcastle upon Tyne (in partnership with 
Gateshead) in rebuilding its reputation as a vibrant city region with a 
 23 
dominant city core in comparison with Tees Valley. While there is no 
space here to make detailed comparisons between the two areas, it is 
important to recognise how key stakeholders constructed a discourse 
about the potentiality of Tees Valley in this context. Essentially, four key 
lines of argument emerged. First, that most resources from key 
government spending agencies in the region are sucked in by the 
Tyneside region at the expense of Tees Valley. Second, that all the major 
decision making agencies in the region (particularly the Regional 
Development Agency, Government Office and the now abolished Regional 
Assembly) were based in Newcastle - consequently, Tees Valley was 
identified as a 'peripheral', or even an 'alien' place. Third, that the 
dominance of Tyneside was increasing as other government agencies 
were restructured and relocated.13 And fourth, that national government 
failed to recognise Tees Valley as a significant urban conurbation in its 
own right but instead regarded its significance only in terms of its 
relationship to Tyneside.14  
It is evident that key stakeholders garnered and circulated stories 
(which were more or less grounded in evidence or prejudice) to support 
the notion that Tees Valley is undermined and under-resourced compared 
with Tyneside. This, in turn, appeared to support the notion that Tees 
Valley 'could be' as successful as Tyneside if only it had the same level of 
political sponsorship and economic investment. Such presumptions led to 
more or less spurious arguments about the potentiality of the area to 
transform itself into a metropolitan city-region.15 This was reinforced, at the 
time of study, by a spate of observations emanating from well-meaning 
commentators in the regional capital to master-plan the Tees riverside to 
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become a vibrant core (as had been achieved in Newcastle/Gateshead 
and, perversely, in Barcelona). 
The assumption that Tees Valley’s future is shaped largely by 
external forces was particularly pronounced when focus groups discussed 
the impact of globalisation. While most bemoaned loss or diminution of 
employment in 'home-grown' heavy industries from the 1970s, it was also 
recognised that the area continued to remain heavily dependent on the 
global market (particularly in chemicals and steel making). However, apart 
from officers with an economic development brief in the boroughs within 
which the industries were located, levels of understanding about these 
markets was very limited. For example, few recognised that much of the 
output from the steel and process industries were dependent upon the 
buoyancy, at that time, of economic activity in India, China and South East 
Asia. Consequently, these economies were wrongly considered mainly as 
a direct threat to the local economy.  As will be explained in the 
conclusion, subsequent economic change, will again reshape attitudes 
about the impact of globalisation on Tees Valley. 
 
What kind of place is Tees Valley?  
Liveability, in policy circles, is a commonly adopted term to measure the 
quality of life in an area. As the State of the Cities Report stated:  
'The liveability agenda is essentially about creating places where 
people choose to live and work. In this sense liveability can be 
understood as a key competitive element between cities in terms of 
attracting both people and businesses to a city.' (Parkinson et al., 
2006: 156).  
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In this study, no attempt was made to constrain the fluidity in the usage of 
the concept, instead, respondents were invited to tell us what they 
understood by the idea and how they felt liveability factors affected the 
future of Tees Valley. Debates about what kind of place Tees Valley is 
now and what it needed to become tended to be constructed in the mirror 
of other ‘more successful’ places. Debates were, then, framed by a 
‘problem centred’ sense of place identity which focused on its industrial 
heritage, the prevalence of deprivation, and the impact of a polycentric 
urban form on its potential to become a ‘city-like’ city region.  
Tees Valley perceives its industrial heritage in contradictory ways. 
On one hand there is much local pride and nostalgia for the days when 
major industrial companies (such as Dorman Long, ICI. British Steel and 
Cleveland Bridge, see also Beynon, et al. 1994; Hudson, 1989) dominated 
the area socially and economically. On the other, environmental impact 
was thought negatively to affect the reputation of the area, (even though 
air quality and the condition of principal watercourses have been tackled 
successfully).16  
The impact of industrial restructuring hit hard in many communities, 
producing deep social deprivation. The negative impact of deprivation 
upon poorer communities (in terms of health, crime, education, skill, 
worklessness, housing quality and neighbourhood decline) was remarked 
upon by all respondents at length - this was widely regarded as a threat to 
positive perceptions of liveability. Housing market failure was precipitated, 
it was often claimed, by residential mobility. The development of a major 
satellite suburb in Ingleby Barwick, in the borough of Stockton-on-Tees 
(boasted locally to be the fastest growing private housing development in 
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Europe), was presumed to draw in buyers from areas adjacent to the 
poorest wards,17 – so producing further socio-economic polarisation, 
cyclical neighbourhood decline and housing market failure in the poorest 
areas.  
In Tees Valley, liveability is cited as a strength and weakness. Its 
proximity to beautiful countryside in Teesdale, the North York Moors and 
the Yorkshire Dales is often highlighted in promotional material about the 
area to attract new businesses and tourists. The historical and cultural 
uniqueness of town life is also emphasised strongly, particularly in the 
more spatially separate towns of Hartlepool, Yarm and Darlington. 
Localism is a key element in the area's liveability offer, but strategists 
seemed to be uncomfortable with this – especially so if the area were to 
attract and retain young professionals. Several respondents remarked 
upon the lack of city-scale residential and leisure opportunities compared 
with the city centres of Newcastle and Leeds and the smaller cathedral 
cities of York and Durham. In sum, Tees Valley's most positive liveability 
characteristics were measured negatively in the mirror of other areas.  
Stakeholders, when contemplating the possibility of Tees Valley 
becoming city-like referred to the area’s relatively large population, which 
is of comparable size to other cities with a much more clearly identifiable 
core. Parr (2004) has warned against the temptation to define PURs with 
large populations as being more similar to metropolitan areas than they 
actually are. This is not to say residents of Tees Valley towns do not want 
to enjoy city-scale facilities. It seems likely, however, that they travel 
outside the sub-region to do so (see also, Meijers, 2007).  
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Stakeholders considered out-migration of graduates as a significant 
problem and, perhaps mistakenly, highlighted liveability factors as the 
principal explanation.18  One respondent recognised, however, that this 
may not be the real problem: ‘It’s not a question of bringing them back or 
keeping them, it’s a question of making the place attractive and having the 
right kinds of jobs to keep or bring them here in the first place.’ The 
general emphasis on retaining graduates rather than attracting them 
suggests a fundamental lack of confidence in the area. This may be 
grounded in reality as employers are relatively under ambitious about 
developing graduate level jobs. Stakeholders were reticent, by contrast, 
about the advantages to be gained from in-migration of younger people 
from new EU accession states.19 Although the extent of migration to Tees 
Valley was unknown, in-migrants were viewed as a problem (taking jobs 
from local people), and reflecting an existing problem (that local people, 
especially from workless households, will not work). The focus on migrant 
workers, rightly, drew attention to the take up of relatively low-paid work, 
and indeed, there was a recognition that many employers were recruiting 
through agencies to increase employee flexibility and possibly suppress 
pay levels. The consequence of this was that local people were unable to 
take jobs offered on flexible contracts because of restrictions imposed by 
state benefit system. Concern about migration were explicable, therefore, 
but stakeholders’ comments reveal questions about the ‘legitimacy’ of in–
migration per se when a more positive focus could be to emphasis the 
potential of migrants to increase skill levels and entrepreneurship (Pillai, 
2006).  
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The idea of negative cultural inertia encapsulates, in summary, an 
'insurmountable problems' mind set which encourages stakeholders to 
adopt a 'sticking plaster' approach to policy interventions. This tendency is 
strengthened by polycentricity which increases parochialism and waters 
down the impact of investment in the area. Cultural inertia appears, 
therefore to be self-reproducing because stakeholders strengthen 
convictions about what is and what is not achievable by drawing upon 
more or less robust local and comparative evidence to support their case.  
Prevalent explanatory accounts for continued social, cultural, 
economic and spatial problems are summarised in the left-hand column of 
Figure 2; alongside which, more positive alternative interpretations are 
offered. Taking just one example to illustrate this point, there was a 
prevalent but implicitly held view that 'small-town culture' is a bad thing for 
Tees Valley. The corollary being if the area could transform itself to 
emulate metropolitan areas, then city culture would follow and the area's 
prospects would improve. This limiting view was a powerful force in 
reproducing cultural inertia rather than tackling it. PURs cannot easily 
transform themselves physically to resemble metropolitan areas for 
several very obvious reasons including, particularly, the prohibitive cost 
and fierce political resistance (see, for example, Parker’s (2000) account 
of political resistance to change in governance arrangements in North 
Staffordshire), unless the economic imperative is so strong that resistance 
is overcome.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
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Making detrimental comparisons with dissimilar cities which have 
transformed their centres with glitzy shops, fancy apartment and office 
blocks, and café and club cultures (which were, until relatively recently, the 
preserve only of the capital) can be counterproductive. Indeed, the visible 
trappings of success at the centre may not ripple that far into the periphery 
and can deepen the sense of malaise in those districts which have been 
left behind (Robinson, 2002). It is not surprising, though, that small-town 
life is felt as second best to metropolitan culture.20 Cities are complex, 
intense, busy and imposing places which, as Simmel (1995) pointed out, 
encourage people to adopt a ‘blasé’ persona. Consequently, suburbanites 
and small-town dwellers may feel, in comparative terms, risk averse, 
parochial and conservative. But, of course, many people who besport 
themselves in metropolitan ways by day, transform back to surburbanites, 
small-town or countryside dwellers by night to enjoy the proximate facility, 
lower property prices, neighbourhood safety and stronger community 
bonds. 
Perceptions can change from within when the local situation 
improves, or, from without when attitudes about other areas, for some 
reason, change. For example, following the credit crunch of 2007-9 and 
the accompanying collapse of metropolitan commercial rents and property 
prices (especially in the buy-to-let market) the ‘shop windows’ of more 
successful cities may have lost their shine. This may lead places like Tees 
Valley to think again about what kind of place it wants to be. In economic 
terms the outlook for smaller cities or PURs like Tees Valley may be as, or 
more, bleak as elsewhere. But when looking in the mirror at larger cities 
which are suddenly exhibiting signs of failure, some of their 
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‘insurmountable problems’ may be re-thought and allow for the 
development of a more positive way of planning for the future. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
When this research was being undertaken on Tees Valley’s social and 
economic circumstances in 2007, the economy was growing rapidly and 
there appeared to be much room for optimism in building a more positive 
economic future for the area. Recession then struck, emanating from an 
international banking crisis which, ironically took its first victim from the NE 
region of England: after a run on Northern Rock Bank.  At the time of 
completing this article in December 2009, Tees Valley was dealt another 
social and economic body blow with the announcement of the closure of 
Teesside Cast Products, the direct loss of 1,700 jobs and an associated 
loss of up to 2,300 more jobs further down the supply chain.  These 
calamitous events were not the responsibility of the people of Tees Valley 
and so, cannot be explained away, as if it was in some sense the area’s 
own fault due to lack of foresight, enterprise or ambition. The cause of 
Tees Valley’s woes is economic, not cultural. 
 The purpose of developing the concept of cultural inertia is to help 
analysts make sense, in sociological terms, of an area’s response to social 
and economic upheavals; and, to help understand why an area makes the 
choices it does, rightly or wrongly, to achieve a positive future. The 
concept of cultural inertia cannot, of course, explain everything we need to 
know about how places position themselves in relation to others in social, 
political and economic terms and subsequently plan for the future. Instead, 
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the concept of cultural inertia should be considered as a useful additional 
analytical tool to compliment other theories which attempt to explain the 
origins of local conditions and the consequences of these conditions. It 
has been shown that path dependency theory, for example, provides 
much scope to account, in historical context, for the patterned web of 
social, spatial and economic interactions which contribute to an area’s 
current situation. Similarly, Grabher’s related concept of ‘lock-in’ helps to 
explain the consequences of anachronistic commitment to particular 
industrial sectoral foundation stones which may limit the prospects for 
successful economic transformation. What both of these accounts seem to 
lack, however, is a dynamic explanation of the social processes which 
underpin decision makers’ tendency to link ideas surrounding economy, 
place and people when constructing ideas on how to effect change.  
 The concept of cultural inertia, this article has shown, provides 
analysts with a powerful tool to help explain how, firstly, areas reflect upon 
their potential in the mirror of other ‘more’ or ‘less’ successful places. It 
has been shown in Tees Valley, for example, that the tendency of decision 
makers to compare their local area with more successful cities produces a 
‘deficit’ model of place – so producing an ‘insurmoutable problems 
mindset’. It is likely that this process is replicated in other areas that have 
suffered significantly from economic restructuring.  Secondly, the concept 
of cultural inertia helps to show why perceptions of what needs to be done 
to un-lock an area’s potential for social and economic development can 
become clouded. This can, in turn, lead to a ‘sticking plaster mentality’ 
when devising responses to overwhelming local need. Explanations for the 
relatively un-ambitious response of an area to such problems can be 
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accounted for by employing ‘categorical fate’. The result is that much of 
the blame for local circumstances is externalised which results in local 
strengths being undervalued or going completely unrecognised.  
Finally, it has been shown that negative cultural inertia can be 
exacerbated in PURs because localities compare themselves with other 
places internally as well as externally, further obfuscating an area’s real 
strengths, increasing parochialism and rivalry, and reducing the prospects 
for collective strategic responses to local needs. In a PUR which lacks a 
vibrant city centre, such as Tees Valley, it should not be assumed that the 
scope for success is fundamentally limited. On the contrary, the area may 
not need a vibrant city-like core to be successful on its own terms. 
Catalytic change can and does come about in areas which have suffered 
from significant industrial restructuring as a result of the actions of highly 
motivated, imaginative and committed stakeholders – but only if they look 
in a positive way at the raw material they have at hand and build on that – 
rather than attempting to emulate other very different places.  
 33 
 
Figure 1 Commonly accepted explanations to account for 
restricted development in Tees Valley 
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Figure 2 Tackling cultural inertia 
 
 
 
Prevalent explanatory accounts for 
social, economic and cultural 
failure 
Positive / alternative 
interpretations 
Politics Parochialism, competition and 
mistrust within and between public, 
private and third sectors militate 
against sub-regional strategic 
cooperation. 
Recognise that local allegiance to a 
sense of place as a strength, but, 
invest for the benefit of the area as a 
whole.  
 There is a tendency to water down 
the quality of developments because 
all the boroughs attempt to deliver 
the full range of amenity. 
Strengthen commitment to the 
development of flagship 
developments which serve the whole 
area and raise local and sub-regional 
sense of pride in place. 
Externalities Assumption that the dominant 
Tyneside city region is unfairly 
advantaged in social, cultural political 
and economic terms and that it acts 
as a drain on regional resource. 
Accept that polycentric urban form 
militates against the development of a 
core metropolitan urban environment 
and build on individual strengths of 
localities and small town culture. 
 Dependence upon and mistrust of 
large transnational employers' 
motivations and assumption that 
global markets make the area unduly 
vulnerable. 
Recognise that the global economy is 
likely to benefit the area and develop 
links so that the whole sub-region 
serves and benefits from such 
development. 
Liveability Area cannot attract or retain people 
because the social, leisure, housing 
and cultural environment is not good 
enough. 
Small town culture is a positive asset 
which should be recognised and built 
upon in order to attract people who 
value such assets.   
 Industrial restructuring, fractured 
urban spatial configuration, poor 
environmental reputation, poor 
transport and social deprivation has a 
negative reputational impact. 
Cross-boundary strategy through City 
Region planning could more 
effectively employ resources and 
challenge this tendency. 
Migration Out-migration of higher skilled/ 
graduate workers undermines 
economic performance. Assumption 
that in-migrants undermine the local 
labour market. 
Recognise that graduate in-migration 
is primarily led by the quality of the 
job offer rather than liveability. Seek 
to constrain employer exploitation of 
low-wage migrants at the expense of 
the local labour market. 
 Intra sub-regional housing migration 
undermines community cohesion and 
deepens pockets of deprivation. 
Continue to tackle housing market 
failure in innovative ways, but 
recognise that inter-borough housing 
migration is neither controllable nor 
necessarily detrimental. 
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Table 1 Spatial, economic and social characteristics 
 
 Darlington Hartlepool Middlesbrough Redcar & Cleveland Stockton-on- Tees 
Spatial form and characteristics      
- population* 99,800 90,500 136,000 138,700 188,300 
- area (sq km) *** 197 94 54 245 204 
      
Economic characteristics*      
- in employment*** 42,993 33,762 49,317 54,296 75,904 
- % econ. Active*** 77.7 72.4 71.8 75.0 78.1 
- % out-commuters**** 13,030 (30%) 9,593 (28%) 20,202 (41%) 21,745 (40%) 26,662 (35%) 
- % in-commuters****  15,562 (34%) 7,920 (25%) 28,313 (49%) 13,106 (29%) 25,966 (35%) 
- % VAT registrations*** 8.9 9.7 8.5 7.4 9.9 
- business stock*** 2,170 1,240 1,820 1,825 3,130 
- reg. per. 1,000 pop*** 26 17 14 13 21 
      
- Male weekly earnings* 366.0 422.6 415.4 484.5 461.3 
- Female weekly earnings* 
 
363.3 333.0 313.9 300.3 308.9 
Social structure      
- % no qualifications* 32.0 39.2 36.8 35.8 31.4 
- % low income households**. 28.0 39.0 43.0 33.0 30.0 
- % claiming IB*** 10.9 12.2 11.8 10.5 8.9 
- long-term limiting illness*** 20.4 24.4 22.3 23.3 19.9 
* Tees Valley Joint Strategy Unit/(October 2006) 
** Tees Valley Joint Strategy Unit.(October 2006) 
*** Government Office for the North East Local Area Profiles (July 2006) 
**** Townsend (2005) 
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1 For a critical discussion of economic policy interventions over the last 30 
years in Teesside see Green et al. (2004). The Tees Valley City Region 
Forerunner Proposal was ultimately rejected by Government, which 
instead favoured regions focusing on financial services clusters. A Multi 
Area Agreement has, however, been achieved, and a new business case 
for a Tees Valley City Region is currently under development. 
2
 The government’s Review of sub-national economic development and 
regeneration (2007: 42), listed in rank order the improvement in GVA of 
urban areas between 1995-2004. Five PURs featured in the bottom six 
places in the table, including Middlesbrough, Stoke, Telford, 
Bolton/Rochdale and Blackburn. 
3
 It is interesting to note that of the five local authorities in Tees Valley only 
one, Hartlepool, chose to participate in the consultation together with the 
sub-regional regeneration company: Tees Valley Regeneration.  
4 The study was commissioned by the Learning and Skills Council Tees 
Valley, funded by the European Social Fund under Objective 3 (Co-
financing), Policy Field 4, Measure 2. 
5 It should be noted that the majority of participants of focus groups had 
not been involved as respondents in the in-depth interview stage of the 
research. Membership to focus groups was achieved through open calls to 
potential participants across Tees Valley and from region-wide policy 
making bodies. Just less than a third of focus group participants had also 
been involved in-depth interviews. 
6
 Historical association with place has strong resonance in the area. 
Hartlepool has rich monastic associations with the development of early 
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Christianity, Darlington, Stockton and Yarm are all ancient market towns. 
Middlesbrough is a 19th century new town, so described by Gladstone as 
‘infant Hercules’ (Briggs, 1968) . The historic division between Yorkshire 
and County Durham remain meaningful as descriptors of who people feel 
they are. For useful historical analyses of regional culture see Robinson 
(2002). 
7
 For detailed information on city region strategic planning see Tees Valley 
Partnership (2007), for a critique of a previous planning under Teesside 
Development Corporation, see Robinson, et al. (1999). 
8
 For example, the main destinations of commuters from Darlington are: 
Stockton-on-Tees (19 per cent), Sedgefield (18 per cent), Yorkshire and 
The Humber (17 per cent) and Middlesbrough (9 per cent). Commuting 
into Darlington is primarily from Sedgefield (25 per cent), Yorkshire and 
The Humber (17 per cent), Stockton-on-Tees (16 per cent) and Wear 
Valley (9 per cent). 
9 A study of Personal Advisors to young people in the Connexions service 
in Tees Valley (Iles et al., 2008) further demonstrates the impact of 
parochial attitudes within the sub-region. The study demonstrated that 
opportunities were not always offered to young people to study or train 
across borough boundaries on the assumptions that ‘they won’t travel’ 
when actual travel flows to FE colleges demonstrated that this is not the 
case.  
10 This is not to say that boroughs never attempted to work together. In the 
case of LEGI, Middlesbrough and Stockton-on-Tees made a joint bid, 
although this was unsuccessful.. 
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11
 It is important to note that public sector officers with a sub-region wide 
brief were aware of such competition but tended to be more critical of this 
as it weakened their case when attempting to develop sub-region wide 
strategy. 
12 At the time of study, Government Office for the North East and RDA 
officers were regularly harangued by Councillors and officers in Darlington, 
for example, for just missing an allocation of Neighbourhood Renewal 
Fund as the 90th ‘worst’ area in the country for multiple deprivation. The 
cut off point for funding was 88.  
13 The loss of Tees Valley based head offices for agencies including 
Business Link Tees Valley, Tees Valley Learning and Skills Council, Job 
Centre Plus (amongst others) was identified as a particular threat to the 
sub-region’s ability to control its own destiny. 
14 A commonly rehearsed (and probably erroneous) story to reflect this is 
the failure of Middlesbrough to gain city status on the grounds that a 
Whitehall mandarin assumed that both Middlesbrough and Sunderland 
were situated on the River Wear and that it was not appropriate to have 
two cities in such close proximity. 
15 It is increasingly being asserted in Tees Valley that a greater focus on 
the development of the Tees will have positive benefits for the area. Much 
work has already been done in this respect with the development of the 
Tees Barrage, the complete redevelopment of the riverside at Stockton 
and Thornaby and the prospects of further development on the north 
shore of the Tees. Middlehaven is also vaunted as a major strategic 
development of an integrated leisure, shopping, education and residential 
environment. These are all welcome and important initiatives, but 
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sometimes lead to the assertion that once they are complete, the cultural 
and economic environment along the riverside could 'be like' other cities 
which have successful riverside urban centres (most particularly 
Newcastle/Gateshead).  
16
 In areas proximate to industrial concentrations, the local population were 
presumed to be culturally acclimatised to environmental and health risks 
associated particularly with process industries, and recognised their 
dependence upon them economically. People who lived and worked 
further afield perceived the industrial heart of the region as an alien place 
and sought to distance themselves from it. 
17
 For a critical discussion of the reasons for housing mobility in the area, 
see Chapman (1999). 
18 Interestingly, most respondents provided anecdotal stories of migration 
and return-migration to the area amongst graduates who had reached the 
family-building stage of their lives to make the point that Tees Valley does 
have strong liveability attractions. It was only in this area of the analysis 
where it was clear that the small-town urban scale and culture in Tees 
Valley was identified as beneficial to the area. 
19 A contemporary government study suggested there were 40,765 
migrant workers in the North East (Home Office figures, reported in The 
Guardian’s Immigration Report, August 23rd 2006). 
20 There is a large literature on the suburban and small town ‘state of 
mind’, see for example Carey, 1992; Oliver, et al., 1981; Chapman, 1999; 
Chapman, Hockey and Wood, 1999; Silverstone, 1997).  
